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ABSTRACT 
This paper contrasts the roles of splitting and dissociation in multiple personality disorder. It is proposed thllt dissociation 
is a unique defensive process that serves to protect the patient from the overwhelming effects of severe trauma and thllt multiple 
personality disorder need not a:zll upon splitting as its central defensive process. Fantasies of restitution may be incorporated into 
the dissociative defense. Psychological, physiological, and behavioral models all are of use, making it likely thllt ultimately dissocia-
tion will be understood along multiple lines of study. 
The dramatic shifts of manifest clinical phenom-
ena noted in patients suffering multiple personality 
disorder have caused some investigators to emphasize 
splitting mechanisms to explain these shifting states 
(Pohl, 1977;Buck,1983;Fast 1974; Berman, 1981; Benner 
& Joscelyne, 1984; Gruenewald, 1977; Gary, Bumstin, & 
Carpenter, 1984; Greaves, 1980; Gruenewald, 1984: 
Marmer, 1980; Lasky, 1978). This paper contrasts the 
roles of splitting and dissociation as defensive structures 
underlying multiple personality disorder. It emphasizes 
the role of dissociation as a major defensive process and 
suggests a Significant role for fantasy in the develop-
ment of multiple personality disorder's clinical picture. 
Dissociation is a unique and invaluable defense 
that does not depend upon splitting for its explanatory 
power. Dissociation is a protective inhibitory ego 
function that maintains conflict laden material and 
painful affects in dissociated states. Further, physiologic 
findings, as well as early somatic and behavioral models 
in infants, may provide new insights into dissociation. 
While splitting may be present in multiple personality 
disorder, it is not a prerequisite for dissociative defenses. 
To avoid the multiple usages and semantic 
confusion that pervade the literature on splitting 
(Pruyser, 1975), in this paper the definition of the term 
"splitting" is restricted to that used by Kernberg 1966 in 
his formulation of borderline personality organization. 
Kernberg referred to splitting as the "alternative activa-
tion of contradictory ego states" (Kernberg, 1966, p.238), 
and observed that the function of splitting is a defensive 
mechanism that keeps "contradictory primitive affect 
states separated from each other" (p.238). He saw that 
these affect states were "inseparably liked with corre-
_ sponding internalized pathological object relations" 
(p.238) and persist as an attempt to deal with the "non-
metabolized" (p.239) or poorly integrated "internalized 
object relationships" (p.239). He observed an associated 
failure in the development of the ''highest level of deper-
sonified superego structures and autonomous ego struc-
tures" (p.237). The ego splitting first occurs naturally, 
when the immature ego lacks the capacity to integrate 
contradictory affective states. Subsequently it is main-
tained or regressively reactivated for defensive purposes 
when the patient is unable to modulate intense affects. 
UMITATIONS IN 
THE CONCEPT OF uSPUTTING" 
Splitting requires certain assumptions about 
psychic structure. Among other things, it necessitates 
the assumption of contradictory underlying ego states, 
organized around polarized affects and introjects. -
Second, splitting assumes a primitive personality 
organization. Third, splitting assumes a structural 
defect; it implies a lack of underlying integration. 
While these assumptions may be of theoretical 
value in understanding borderline personality organiza-
tion, they don't adequately account for the striking and 
unique symptom picture seen in multiple personality 
disorder. 
These assumptions pose significant problems 
when applied to the phenomenology of actual patients. 
In clinical practice, many multiple personality disorder 
patients function at a high level of organization, and 
primitive defensive operations need not permeate their 
personality structure (Horevitz & Braun, 1984; Kluft, 
1984a). Secondly, it is now clear that many alters are not 
polarized around contradictory ego states (Confer & 
Ables, 1983; Schrei~r, 1973). There are often multiple 
alters whose characteristics may overlap Significantly. 
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Alters are not necessarily defined by opposing affects 
and introjects. In Confer and Ables' (1983) case, Rene, 
the alters were all helpful in resolving the multiplicity. 
Further the presence of 20, 30, or in Benner and 
Joscelyne's (1984) patient, 71 personalities, requires us to 
accept 71 primitive self and object representations with 
discrete affective linkages. With phenomena of such 
complexity, their resemblance to splitting as Kernberg 
(1966) defined the term becomes quite remote. Cases of 
this complexity suggest that dissociation itself, rather 
than splitting, is being used as a defense. Moreover, 
splitting fails to explain the development of new alters 
with continued abuse, or the restitutive functions of alter 
personalities in coping with chronic trauma. Finally, 
splitting requires us to accept an unconscious structural 
defect. While many patients may have such a defect, 
there is no requirement for a structural defect to account 
for dissociative defenses. 
There is, in fact, much to suggest that beneath the 
diverse symptomatology of multiple personality disor-
der there exists considerable underlying unity. This 
unity is obscured by dissociation, not disrupted by a 
structural split. Directional amnesia, shared experiences 
among alters, overlapping memories, "inner-self help-
ers" that know all of the patients's experiences, and 
leakage between alters, especially as therapy progresses, 
all suggest a process of active but reversible separation 
of painful memory traces through inhibition rather than 
splitting. Following integration, the sudden recall of 
memories and affect (which now feel like they belong to 
the patient) further suggests an underlying unity. 
Forgotten experiences are remembered and felt as 
returning and belonging to a whole person. The pres-
ence of dissociative states that are not organized as 
discrete personalities suggests that there are several 
varieties of dissociation, and argues against splitting as 
the central mechanism. 
For example, one 26 year old woman treated by 
the author awoke as herself at age 14, and attempted to 
get ready for school. Spiegel and Rosenfeld (1984) 
described this as spontaneous age regression. Another 
patient, a 34 year old woman was sexually assaulted by 
her father repeatedly over a period of many years. The 
I father was not only physically abusive, he also told her 
he would kill her if she became pregnant. This history 
was obtained from an alter; the primary personality was 
still amnesic for the abuse and threats. The primary 
knew she had conflicts around sexuality. When I sug-
gested she had work to do around her fears of preg-
nancy, she immediately dissociated into an apparently 
mute, deaf, and immobile state, and was unresponsive 
for the remainder of the session. The splitting of contra-
dictory ego states did not appear to be as central as the 
, dissociation of painfully repressed material. 
At times, the distinction among dissociations 
: short of multiple personality disorder phenomena, 
:; multiple personality disorder phenomena, and border-
line phenomena can be hard to make. In the previous 
HI34 
case, for example, one alter oscillated between intense 
denial of any abuse and intense rageful self-destructive 
abreactions. When her denial was breached, she went 
through a vivid reliving of the rape experience, complet 
with the assumption of the physical position in which 
she had been assaulted, and reenacted the movements 
associated with the event. She re-experiencing the 
accompanying beating, cried out, "I'm bad! I'm bad!" 
She would repeatedly bang her head on an area that ha 
been injured during this episode. These abreactions 
were predictable and stereotyped, but unknown to the 
primary personality. One might argue that the patient's 
intense affect and her self-accusations as bad repre-
sented a split self-representation and an accompanying 
affect. One could also see that she was treating herself i 
accordance with an identification with her cruel and 
punishing father who had been internalized. He had 
told her that she was bad. However, the stereotyped 
repetitive abreactions with the characteristic amnesic 
dissociation of the entire event, all of which remained 
unknown to the primary personality, seem much more 
in keeping with a view of dissociation as a mechanism 0 
avoiding the painful memory of an overwhelming early 
experience through inhibitory mechanisms. 
Beyond this, an over-emphasis on splitting 
requires acceptance at face value that the manifest 
symptom of multiple personalities directly reflects 
unconscious structure; if conscious experience shifts, 
then unconscious structure must be split. This explana-
tion gives short shrift, among other things, to the com-
plexity of unconscious mechanisms, and the roles of 
fantasy (Congdon, Hain & Stevenson, 1961; Davis, 1950) 
or state dependent learning (Ludwig, Brandsma, Wilbur, 
Benefelt & Jameson, 1972; Braun, 1984) as elements 
contributing to alter personality formation. 
THE ROLE OF FANTASY IN 
THE DISSOCIATIVE DEFENSE 
Fantasy itself has a major role in determining the 
symptom picture seen in multiple personality disorder, 
without regard to the process of splitting. When they 
become connected to dissociative states, defensive 
distortions and early fantasies, arising from a traumatic 
origin, color the clinical picture that is seen. Many of the 
characteristics of alter personalities reflect elaborate 
fantasies of restitution in children who have suffered 
severe traumatization. This process of developing a 
restitutive fantasy life, together with symbolic elabora-
tions in alter personality formation, is probably univer-
sal among multiple personality disorder patients. 
One can see fantasy elaboration in many circum-
stances. One woman presented an angry alter Lucinda, 
who adopted a name opposite her "perfect" sister Cindy 
Lou. The author has encountered alters named Black, 
Blue, and the Prince of Darkness. He is aware of alters 
whose names merely reflect the symbolic representation 
of a function, such as Slap, Runner, or Escape. One alter 
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presented as "Pooh Bear." Another had an alter named 
Stacey, who remained to stay and see the abuse that was 
endured. Bliss (1984) met a Cheshire cat. These are 
commonplace examples of the use of fantasy and the 
symbolic representation of functions used in surviving 
abusive situations. They so often color the clinical 
picture of multiple personality disorder that anyone 
treating such patients will encounter them. In fact, the 
production of any personality with its own name and 
history implies the use of fantasy. Bliss (1984) states 
categorically that "Personalities are obviously imaginary 
constructs" (p.140). It is his contention that the person-
alities are the result of dissociated fantasies produced 
through spontaneous self-hypnosis (Bliss 1980, 1984). 
It is imperative to recognize, however, that 
multiple personality is not a confabulation, but rather 
that fantasy elaborations are efforts at mastering severe 
child abuse. Defensive distortions of this nature regu-
larly can be seen. For example, one patient recollected 
being victimized severely when she was raped repeat-
edly by several men. Another alter, however, fantasized 
that she was being promiscucous and in control, and 
described herself as sexually active and enjoying the 
sexual encounters with these men. She, in fact, de-
scribed a sense of mastery through her ability to have 
repeated sexual encounters in which she felt she was in 
charge. In these instances, the distortions and fantasies 
served the purpose of mastery and psychic restitu tion 
from the trauma. 
As fantasies become dissociated and connected to 
dissociated states, they may come to be believed in with 
the same lack of critical judgment as shown by patients 
receiving suggestions in deep hypnotic trance states. A 
classic example of the influence of a dissociated fantasy 
on one's conscious experience of reality is the case of 
Bridey Murphy reviewed by Hilgard (1977). Under 
hypnosis Virginia Tighe began talking in a thick Irish 
brogue and recalled a prior life as Bridey Murphy in 
Cork, Ireland. There was enormous reinforcement for 
this patient's belief in her prior life, including a cele- . 
brated best selling book, The Search for Bridey Murphy 
(Bernstein,1956). Later, it was discovered that as a 
teenager, Virginia lived for five years across from a Mrs. 
Anthony Corkell. Note the similarity of the name . 
Corkell to the name of the city of Cork where Bridey 
supposedly lived. Mrs. Corkell had fascinated Virginia 
with her Irish background, and one of her sons bore the 
same name as Bridey's suitor. The story became clearer 
still when it was discovered that Mrs. Corkell's maiden 
~me was, in fact, Bridie Murphy, but spelled with an -ie 
mstead of an -ey. Here we can see the powerful influ-
ence of fantasy and its impact on a patient's experience 
of reality when it is connected to a dissociated state. 
It should be clear that fantasy elaborations in 
mUltiple personality are in the service of mastery and 
serve a compensatory function in patients who have 
been severely abused. It is not suggested that the 
traUmatic events themselves are fantasies, but rather that 
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fantasies become connected to dissociated states and 
serve a protective and restitutive function. The docu-
mentation of severe prolonged child abuse in etiology of 
multiple personality has been clearly established (Bliss, 
1980,1984; Boor, 1982; Bowman, 1985; Coons & Milstein, 
1984,1986; Greaves, 1980; Putnam, 1986; Saltman & 
Solomon, 1982; Spiegel, 1984; Wilbur, 1984, 1985). 
THE FUNCTION OF DISSOCIATION 
In multiple personality disorder, the primary 
symptoms are dissociated mental organizations, inhib-
ited or perhaps faulty memory processing, and shifting 
between dissociated mental organizations or ego states. 
The concept of ego states is an extensive subject 
in itself and will not be explored in depth here. In the 
following discussion the term ego state is used in a 
general sense to represent a specific and consistent 
mental organization that is dominated by a particular 
affect that links a particular self representation with a 
particular object representation. A given ego state may 
vary within limits according to its affective variance, but 
is relatively stable in its self and object representations. 
This is similar to Kemberg's (1966) view, which links 
object and self representations with a corresponding 
affect. The term ego state is obviously an oversimplified 
rendering of a highly complex mental organization that 
includes multiple contributions from instinctual urges, 
character traits, defensive constellations, somato-sensory 
processing, ego ideals, and moral pressures that reflect 
not only states within the ego, but many processes 
normally understood as functions originating from id 
and superego components as well. 
The unique feature of dissociation is a protective 
and inhibitory capacity of the ego to maintain conflict-
laden material in dissociated states. The inhibitions in 
memory processing reduce over-stimulation through an 
elimination of painful material from the primary 
personality's field of consciousness. It would appear 
that a clearer understanding of dissociation is needed. 
In this discussion, dissociation is defined as an 
active inhibitory process that normally screens internal 
and external stimuli from the field of consciousness. 
Dissociation functions as a shut-off mechanism (Spitz, 
1961; Fraiberg, 1982) to prevent over-stimulation or 
flooding of consciousness by excessive incoming stimuli. 
Evidence suggests that this inhibitory process may have 
somatic and behavioral precursors at the earliest stages 
of development (Spitz, 1%1; Fraiberg, 1982; Lichtenberg 
& Slap, 1972). These inhibitory processes can become 
organized psychologically to defend against painful and 
intolerable experiences. Dissociation regularly elimi-
nates from consciousness painful memories in a variety 
of conditions, from simple fugue states, to traumatic 
neuroses, to somnambulistic abreactions, to the complex 
dissociative amnesias seen in multiple personality 
disorder. 
Under normal conditions, dissociation enhances 
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the integrating functions of the ego by screening out ex-
cessive or irrelevant stimuli. In the service of normal 
functioning, most of our mental life is dissociated at any 
given time. Under pathological conditions, one finds an 
interruption of integrating functions as in conversion 
symptoms, amnesias, or dissociated ego states. In these 
instances, the normal functions of dissociation become 
mobilized for defensive use. 
It would appear then that the primary function of 
dissociation, in many instances, is one of avoidance of 
intrapsychic pain that does not require a splitting of 
psychic structure for its conception. Hypnosis regularly 
brought one patient, for example, to the edge of a crucial 
traumatic memory during which she had seen or heard a 
terrifying event behind closed doors. When she ap-
proached the doors during hypnosis, an alter regularly 
emerged who refused to divulge the information. In a 
second patient, a tough, assertive alter became increas-
ingly aware of the depression surrounding her emer-
gence and her defensive stance. However, for months, 
rather than cry in a session, another alter, a child, 
emerged and cried while the first avoided her own tears. 
It is of interest how often severe trauma results in 
anesthesia and out-of-body experiences in which one 
seems to be "floating above their own body, viewing 
rather dispassionately what is being done to it" (Spiegel, 
1984, p.l0t). Hillman (1981) described a hostage in a 
prison riot who could see his body moving, so he knew 
he had been kicked, but who felt nothing. The func-
tional shut-off mechanism is obvious and highly remi-
niscent of the protective dissociations in multiple 
personality disorder. Alters in multiple personality 
disorder are often specifically organized not only to 
survive or be anesthetic to the original trauma, but to 
prevent recall of the early abuse. They intervene in all 
possible ways to maintain a primary personality's disso-
ciative barriers and keep the painful memories sepa-
rated. Even when an alter repeatedly abreacts a trauma, 
the primary personality may remain oblivious to it. 
NEW MODELS 
The distinction between dissociation and splitting 
is reconfirmed when we examine physiologic and 
behavioral models of dissociation. Emde, Harmon, 
Metcalf, Koenig, and Wagonfeld (1971) noted in new-
born infants, for example, that routine circumcision 
without anesthesia was "usually followed by a pro-
longed non-rapid eye movement sleep" (p.496), a state 
generally considered a low point on an arousal contin-
uum. Emde postulates a "reduction of incoming stimuli 
by alteration of sensory thresholds" (p.49t), in this case, 
by sleep. Even at birth, there appears a capacity to 
eliminate excessively painful stimuli. 
There is even evidence for the inheritibility of 
_ dissociative phenomena in Morgan's (1973) study of 
, hypnotizability in identical twins. Compared to non-
twin controls, she found a statistically significant 
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"genetic component in hypnotizability" (p.55). It seems 
clear now that dissociative phenomena and probably 
multiple personality disorder are transgenerational. 
There are now several reports of multiple personality 
occurring in families across more than one generation 
(KIuft, 1984a; KIuft, 1984b; Braun, 1985; Coons, 1985). 
The relative importance of genetic and environmental 
contributions respectively remains to be established. 
Many physiologic studies now note changes 
between alter personalities including differences in \ 
handedness, EEG and/or EMG findings, and in galvani 
skin responses, some of which have been interpreted to 
suggest changes in hemispheric dominance between 
personalities (Ludwig, Brandsma, Wilbur, Benfeldt, & 
Jameson, 1972; Coons, 1984; Braun, 1983; Brende, 1984; 
Putnam, 1984; Sutcliffe & Jones, 1962). 
Findings of dissociative phenomena in patients 
with temporal lobe abnormalities lend further impetus 
to developing physiologic models in the production of 
dissociation (Shenk & Bear, 1981; Mesulam, 1981; Akhta 
& Brenner, 1979; Sutcliffe & Jones, 1962; Coons, 1984; 
Bear & Fedio, 1977; Devinsky & Bear, 1984). The signifi-
cance of these physiologic alterations remains to be 
clarified, but clearly physiologic models can be further 
developed to help understand dissociation where a 
model of structural splitting may not apply. 
Lastly, behavioral models derived from infant 
observation may provide intriguing insights into the 
origin of dissociation. Fraiberg (1982) studied 12 se-
verely abused infants and noted behaviors that are 
hauntingly familiar to behaviors seen in multiple 
personality disorder. Infants develop pathological 
defenses when faced with overwhelming helplessness 
and abuse. These defenses reveal attempts to cope at a 
stage where psychological mechanisms would be, at 
best, embryonic. Infants can selectively screen out all 
perceptions of the abusive mother, essentially editing 
any recognition and thereby any painful affect associ-
ated with the mother's percept. Fraiberg (1982) states, 
"the behavior suggests that, at intolerable limits, there is 
a cutoff mechanism that functions to obliterate the 
experience to intolerable pain, analogs with physiologi-
cal pain suggest themselves" (p.62t). Fraiberg notes 
that, "the mechanism in which the perception of a 
painful stimulus can be abolished from consciousness 
may be present in early development" (p.622). 
Other infants under conditions of "extreme peril" 
(p.622) will become frozen and immobilized, staring into 
space over long periods, completely unresponsive of 
efforts to intervene. When this "freezing" (p.622) breaks 
down, a complete disintegration takes place, as in one 
infant who "screams, flails wildly, begins to strike her 
mother ... and finally runs into a closet to hide ... she 
seems out of touch with reality" (p.624). 
In other infants, anxiety could provoke a switch 
from anxiety to fighting behavior or self-directed 
aggression. Often these infants reveal high thresholds 
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for pain that become lower in the course of successful 
treatment. These pathological behaviors appear as early 
mechanisms maintaining integration in the face of 
overwhelming stress. 
Observations of this sort may show us early de-
fensive operations that could, in 'some cases, evolve into 
dissociative defenses. These dissociative defenses 
become crucial to the defensive structure of multiple 
personality disorder and will be understood as highly 
complex operations the understanding of which will 
emerge from investigation along multiple lines of study. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This discussion has presented the limitations in 
the concept of splitting as an explanation for the disso-
ciative processes seen in multiple personality disorder. 
Dissociation itself is seen as a major unifying force in its 
own right. Dissociation is a protective inhibitory ego 
function that maintains conflict-laden material and 
painful affects in dissociated states. Early childhood 
fantasy contributes to the symptom picture by its 
defensive incorporation into these dissociated states. 
Newer research findings hold promise for enriching our 
understanding of the role of dissociation in the defensive 
structure of multiple personality disorder. 
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